by Chris Wolf
Sanction simply consists in giving your moral approval to something. It's the equivalent of saying, "I morally approve of this. I support this."
Normally, sanction requires an explicit statement of support and approval on your part, and cannot be done unconsciously or unwittingly. However there are some actions, such as giving money to the Ku Klux Klan, that directly imply sanction by their very nature. In other words, if you gave money to the Klan, there would be no other conceivable explanation for it, except that you really do support the Klan. Or if one friend steals money from another, and you knowingly continue to be friends with the thief, that could logically be treated as a sanction of the thief.
However such actions of implied sanction are rather rare. In most cases, there are a number of possible explanations, in addition to the possibility of sanction. For example, the fact that you might buy groceries from a man who is a Klan member, does not automatically qualify as a sanction. You might be buying groceries because you know you're supporting the Klan, or you might simply be buying groceries because you're hungry. The rest of us can't tell, solely from your action. It would be necessary to question you. Obviously one does not wish to support one's enemies, but in today's interlocking, interdependent world, it's impossible to live a normal life without conferring some benefits on one's enemies. However such benefits do not constitute sanction. All of us are forced to deal with people we don't approve of, but that's just the point; if we don't approve of them, then we're not sanctioning them.
Unfortunately, in the current Objectivist movement, the principle of sanction has run amok. It has come to mean almost any situation where a benefit or value is conferred on your enemies. The idea that merely speaking to a group of your intellectual opponents somehow constitutes a sanction of them, is one of the more absurd ways in which the principle of sanction has been distorted beyond all recognition.
For Objectivists, the question of sanction mostly boils down to, "What is the proper degree of involvement with groups who do not share my philosophy? To whom can I speak without inadvertently sanctioning them?"
Anytime that you speak to any group, there is a certain measure of sanction involved. You are admitting that such a group is not outside the realm of civilized discourse. Of course, the key question is, where does one draw the line? Different people give wildly different answers, which would suggest that different principles are involved.
I submit that such differences can be explained via the concept of inherently dishonest ideas. If one subscribes to this concept, then one will have a particular view of sanction. If one does not subscribe to this concept, then one will have a very different view of sanction. Let us compare these two viewpoints.
If someone embraces the concept of inherently dishonest ideas, then one is, in effect, claiming that certain ideas cannot be held honestly. One automatically knows that anyone holding an inherently dishonest idea is dishonest, or is guilty of evasion. Obviously if an entire group embraces an inherently dishonest idea, then the group is, in essence, guilty of evasion, and must be treated accordingly.
If a group is guilty of evasion, then it is impossible to have a rational discussion with them. A rational discussion implies that both sides are seeking the truth. If one side is deliberately refusing to seek the truth, then rational discussion is impossible. From this, we can conclude that any attempt at rational discussion with a group who has embraced an inherently dishonest idea, is not only a waste of time, but would also be highly irrational. To attempt to seek the truth with someone whom you know to be evading, is a complete contradiction. To knowingly embrace and participate in such a contradiction would be guilty of willful irrationality.
This is why the supporters of Leonard Peikoff will not speak to organized groups of libertarians, Nazis, Communists, etc. They consider such groups to be dishonest evaders (or at least the leaders and intellectual spokesmen of such groups). Given this premise, it would be very irrational for any supporter of the concept of inherently dishonest ideas to speak to such a group, for they would be giving sanction to their enemies. The very act of speaking to such a group would be an implied sanction. They would be saying, in effect, "I consider the members of this group to be honest seekers of the truth. That is why I am willing to speak to them." And it would be a lie. No honest, rational man would wish to be guilty of so irrational a deed.
However if one does not accept the concept of inherently dishonest ideas, then one will have a very different view of sanction. Just as one grants benevolence to strangers by assuming they are honest and rational, one also assumes that someone who holds a false idea is holding it due to honest error, rather than evasion. Therefore one would not automatically regard a group of Nazis, Communists, or Libertarians as automatically dishonest. One would presume they were honestly mistaken, and seeking the truth. This assumption would not change until one had conclusive evidence to the contrary that such people are dishonest evaders. But the false idea alone would not constitute conclusive evidence. Under such conditions, speaking to such groups is simply a matter of cost/benefit analysis, tactics, and taste.
If one rejects the concept of inherently dishonest ideas, then the only sanction one grants by speaking to Communists or Libertarians is the assumption that such groups are open to civilized discussion. One is admitting that the members of such groups still retain a conceptual capacity, have the potential to be persuaded by a rational argument, and are willing to engage in civilized discourse. Of course, if this proves not to be the case, or if one already knows from past experience that this is not the case, then it would be very irrational and immoral to speak to such a group. One would be refusing to acknowledge a fact of reality, namely that one's opponents are not worthy of civilized debate. However such a conclusion cannot be known, solely on the basis of the group's ideas, if one rejects the concept of inherently dishonest ideas.